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The short interest of a stock refers to the total amount of shares shorted by traders, 
professional investors and hedge funds, who profit from a decline in the stock price. 
Market participants can gain an informational advantage if the short interest level of a 
stock contains relevant information about the future share price development. Although 
prior research has shown that stocks with high short interest levels are more likely to 
experience negative abnormal returns in the following months, the relation has not been 
widely investigated for NASDAQ listed securities during the rising equity market from 
2012 to 2019. 
 
The aim of this Bachelor’s thesis is to analyse the one-month abnormal return of 
NASDAQ listed stocks with either a very low or a very high short interest level during 
the period 2012 to 2019. Both the short interest as a percentage of float (SIPF) and the 
short interest ratio (SIR) are applied to determine which metric provides higher and more 
significant abnormal returns. Stocks are ranked each month to form equal-weighted 
portfolios based on either the SIPF or the SIR level retrieved from Bloomberg. The lightly 
shorted portfolios include securities below the 1st and 10th percentiles, while the heavily 
shorted portfolios contain stocks above the 90th and 99th percentiles. To evaluate the 
absolute performance, the total return over the entire period, as well as the geometric 
average return, is determined. Abnormal returns are estimated through ordinary least 
squares regressions and by applying two different multi-factor asset pricing models.  
 
The empirical results indicate that portfolio formations based on the metric SIPF deliver 
higher and more significant returns than ones sorted by SIR, regardless of the asset pricing 
model. Lightly shorted portfolios generate significant excess returns when containing 
stocks below the 1st percentile (1.1% per month) and below the 10th percentile (1.0% per 
month). In contrast, the heavily shorted portfolios experience a significant negative 
abnormal return if they comprise stocks above the 90th percentile (-0.9% per month) and 
above the 99th percentile (-1.4% per month). 
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In conclusion, short interest as a percentage of float can be a valuable sentiment indicator 
for forecasting the future share price development of NASDAQ listed securities. The 
findings of this study confirm prior research suggesting that buying stocks with a very 
low short interest level potentially leads to higher returns for investors, while stocks with 
a very high short interest level should be avoided or sold due to the high probability of 
underperforming considerably. 
 
Further studies could investigate the relation between short interest and the subsequent 
stock return for non-U.S. markets. It would be desirable to implement short interest 
estimations from financial data providers covering shorter time periods – for example, on 
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1.1 Background and Problem Definition  
Shorting a stock, also known as short selling, is a controversial strategy widely used by 
traders, professional investors and hedge funds. It involves selling borrowed shares with 
the aim of repurchasing them at lower prices to return to the lender. Since profits can only 
be realised in the event of a falling share price, short sellers focus primarily on overvalued 
stocks and avoid undervalued or fairly valued securities.  
 The total amount of shares shorted by market participants but not yet bought back 
is called short interest. If a particular security has a high short interest, it signals that many 
well-informed and knowledgeable financial experts currently consider the shares to be 
overvalued and thus expect a falling share price. This gives rise to the question of whether 
the current short interest level of a stock contains relevant information about the future 
share price development – information that could be systematically used to earn higher 
returns. This would, however, contradict the theory of efficient markets, which states that 
the current price of a security reflects all information, including historical market trading 
data such as short interest. It would therefore not be possible to generate a significant 
positive or negative abnormal return that is not captured by a multi-factor asset pricing 
model, for example the Fama-French three-factor model or the Carhart four-factor model. 
  
Moreover, the global stock market mostly moved upwards and regularly reached new  
all-time highs between 2012 and 2019, making it challenging for short sellers to bet on 
falling share prices. The trend may have also influenced the informative value of short 
interest. The NASDAQ Composite Index, which contains all stocks traded on the 
NASDAQ Stock Market, performed particularly well over this eight-year period due to 
the sharp rise in equity prices of information technology companies.  
 Although several studies have confirmed that heavily and lightly shorted stocks 
generated abnormal returns after consideration of multi-factor asset pricing models, the 
predictive power of short interest on the subsequent return of NASDAQ listed stocks 
during the rising equity market over the last eight years has not been widely investigated. 
To address the knowledge gap concerning that particular time frame, this study focuses 
on the relationship between short interest and future returns of NASDAQ stocks during 
the months January 2012 to December 2019. 
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The NASDAQ Stock Market is divided into three different market tiers. Listed companies 
must meet certain financial, liquidity and corporate governance requirements in order to 
remain listed on the stock exchange and the corresponding market level (Nasdaq, Inc., 
2020a): 
 
1) NASDAQ Global Select Market (most stringent requirements) 
2) NASDAQ Global Market  
3) NASDAQ Capital Market (least stringent requirements) 
 
The average short interest as a percentage of daily trading volume across all NASDAQ 
listed securities between 2011 and 2019 ranged from three to five days and was mostly 
constant over time, as shown in figure 1. In contrast, the average short interest of less 
capitalised firm listings, reflected by the NASDAQ Capital Market, was more 
inconsistent and volatile. It is therefore essential to include small-capitalised companies 
in the dataset to prevent a size bias. 
 
 




1.2 Research Question and Objective 
This paper analyses one-month returns of portfolios, containing NASDAQ stocks with 
either a very high or a very low short interest, during the period January 2012 to 
December 2019. The aim is to provide answers to the following research question: 
 
1) How did NASDAQ listed stocks with a very low or a very high short interest level 
perform in the following month, and did these securities generate significant 
abnormal one-month returns based on multi-factor asset pricing models? 
 
Although most existing literature has used short interest as a percentage of shares 
outstanding as an indicator for future returns, this paper considers the short interest as a 
percentage of float (SIPF) and the short interest ratio (SIR) to determine which of the two 
metrics provides better and more consistent results. The second research question is 
therefore:  
 
2) Are both the short interest as a percentage of float and the short interest ratio 
reliable indicators of subsequent one-month stock returns, and which metric 
provides higher and more significant abnormal one-month stock returns? 
 
A brief relative sector analysis is then performed by comparing the sector exposure of the 
individual short interest portfolios with the sector weightings of the NASDAQ Composite 
Index. The aim is to explore which sectors are more exposed to short selling activity. For 
this reason, the final research question is: 
 
3) How do sector weightings differ between the constructed short interest portfolios 
and the market index? 
 
1.3 Overview 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of 
short selling, the publication of short interest information in different countries, the most 
relevant short selling metrics, the efficient market hypothesis and asset pricing models. 
Chapter 3 presents the current state of knowledge on short interest levels, and chapter 4 
describes the dataset, the portfolio formation and the method of analysis. Chapter 5 
discusses the empirical results, and in chapter 6 the conclusions are briefly summarised.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical background of short selling, 
market efficiency and asset pricing models for the measurement of risk-adjusted returns.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Short Selling 
In order to short a security, an investor must first find an existing owner (lender) who is 
willing to lend the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. 
The short seller (borrower) needs to leave an initial collateral with the broker-dealer, 
which is at least the market value of the borrowed share and typically 102% of the market 
value for U.S. securities. Under Regulation T, the Federal Reserve Board requires short 
sellers to deposit a higher initial margin of at least 150% of the value, if the lender is a 
U.S. broker-dealer. Cash is the most common form of collateral (D’Avolio, 2002, p. 275).  
In case the share price declines, the short seller is obliged to hold the cash collateral, even 
if they have sufficient assets available in the margin account. However, if the price rises, 
they are required to increase their collateral. The short seller must pay a stock loan fee as 
well as any dividend they receive from the borrowed security to the lender. As the short 
seller lends their cash collateral, the lender pays them a rebate rate, which consists of the 
current market interest rate minus the stock loan fee (Werner, 2010, p. 8).   
 
Changes of the rebate rate for every stock occur daily. Hence, this rebate rate acts as an 
equilibrium in the securities lending market, balancing supply and demand. The majority 
of large-capitalised stocks are usually cheap and easy to borrow, meaning the rebate rate 
is high and short sellers can quickly find a stock lender. In contrast, stocks that are 
expensive and hard to borrow undergo short sales constraints and may even have a 
negative rebate rate. A negative rebate rate means that short sellers need to make a daily 
payment to the lender for the right to borrow the shares, instead of receiving a regular 
payment from the lender as interest on the short sale proceeds. Illiquid small-capitalised 
stocks with low institutional ownership and securities that are in high demand for 
borrowing are the items most affected by these short sale constraints (Jones & Lamont, 
2002, pp. 211–212).  
 
At some point, short sellers need to close their position by returning the borrowed stock 
to the lender. The resulting profit or loss of the transaction consists of the difference 
between the initial short sale price and the current repurchase price. If the security is being 
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traded lower in the meantime, the borrower can cover their short position and obtain the 
securities cheaper on the market, which results in a profit. On the other hand, if the share 
price has risen since the inception of the loan, the short seller generates a loss. 
 
The lender has the right to request the return of his shares at any time. Once the lender 
terminates the equity loan, and if the stock price has increased in the meantime, short 
sellers are forced to close their position at a loss if they are not able to find other shares 
to borrow within a period of three days (Geczy, Musto, & Reed, 2002, p. 244).  
 
2.2 Publication of Short Interest Data 
The regulations on the publication of short interest data is treated differently depending 
on the country of the stock exchange. As shown in the left column of table 1, markets in 
Japan and in countries from the European Union (EU) only publish the short interest data 
by position holder. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) requires 
short sellers to report to the relevant National Competent Authority (NCA), if the shares 
are traded on an EU regulated market and the position reaches or exceeds a certain 
threshold level of the issued share capital (European Securities and Markets Authority, 
2013). The information, however, is difficult to interpret from an investor’s point of view, 
as not all short positions are published, and a manual calculation is required to determine 
the total shares shorted for a specific stock.  
 For that reason, empirical studies on short selling activity more often investigate 
securities from countries listed in the right column of table 1. In these countries, stock 
exchanges publish short interest data by traded volume and position and thus increase 
market transparency. Moreover, the stock exchanges offer a comprehensive and clearly 
arranged overview of current short interest levels on their websites free of charge. 
 
Countries with Short Interest Data by  
Position Holder 
Countries with Short Interest Data by  
Traded Volume and Position 
Austria Greece Poland Australia Israel Singapore 
Belgium Hungary Portugal Brazil Malaysia South Korea 
Denmark Ireland Spain Canada Mexico Taiwan 
Finland Italy Sweden  China New Zealand Thailand 
France Japan United Kingdom Chile Norway Turkey 
Germany Netherlands   Hong Kong Peru United States 
Table 1: Short Interest Reporting by Country (Exchange Data International, n.d.) 
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Short interest data is published every two weeks for NASDAQ listed securities. Every 
broker-dealer regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in  
the U.S. is responsible for reporting the total short interest position in all customer and 
proprietary accounts bi-weekly. The reports are filed on the 15th and the last business day 
of each month and then published by the stock exchange eight business days later (Nasdaq 
Trader, n.d.).  
 
However, there is a high demand for short interest data that is less delayed, or for markets 
with no regulatory requirements such as Switzerland. Therefore, in order to estimate the 
approximate level of short interest on a daily basis, or even in real time, financial 
information providers such as S3 Partners (2018) and IHS Markit (n.d.) collate securities 
lending data, including rebate rates, directly from broker-dealers and custodians, as 
explained in section 2.1. The providers then extrapolate the obtained lending and 
borrowing information in order to offer an estimated short interest of many global stocks. 
The estimates are considered very accurate, as this process requires large amounts of data 




2.3 Short Selling Metrics 
In the following section, three commonly applied short selling metrics that serve as a 
market sentiment indicator are explained. Since the literature presents various definitions, 
the ratios are defined according to the Bloomberg Terminal. 
 
• Short interest as a percentage of shares outstanding is defined as the total number of 
shares shorted in relation to the total shares outstanding. The vast majority of 






• Short interest as a percentage of float (SIPF) is defined as the total number of shares 
shorted in relation to the equity float. The float corresponds to the number of shares 
that are available to the public and is calculated by subtracting the shares held by 
insiders, and those deemed to be stagnant shareholders, from the shares outstanding. 
A major advantage of this indicator is the improved reflection of short interest level 
for newly listed companies. After an initial public offering (IPO), the participation 
of insiders, such as executives and directors of the firm, is usually high, which can 
skew the amount of shares outstanding. For example, a newly listed company may 
have a total of 100 million shares outstanding. However, due to the high level of 
insider ownership, 60 million shares belong to employees within the firm who are 
not allowed to legally trade the security on a stock exchange until the lock-up period 






• Short interest ratio (SIR) is defined as the short interest divided by the average daily 
trading volume for a specific time period, in this case over the last 30 trading days. 
The metric is also called the days-to-cover ratio, because it indicates how many days 






2.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
A concept by Fama (1965) suggests that stock market prices follow a random walk, and 
that their short-term movements are unpredictable. Based on this mechanism of the 
financial market, which consists of hundreds of thousands of participants, all available 
information is always correctly taken into account when determining stock prices.  
In other words, the market is driven by rational expectations and behaves efficiently. 
 Assuming that market participants as a whole behave rationally on average, the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) describes three forms of informational efficiencies in 
financial markets: weak, semi-strong and strong (Fama, 1970). 
 
• The weak form of efficiency asserts that stock prices reflect all historical 
information contained in market trading data. Any kind of data regarding past 
share prices, trading volume or numbers of shorted shares are not related to future 
price movements, because everything known has already been priced in. 
Therefore, an investment strategy based on technical analysis or short interest 
cannot consistently result in higher returns than the market and generate excess 
returns.   
 
• The semi-strong form of efficiency states that in addition to historical information, 
all publicly available information, such as fundamental data or earnings forecast, 
is included in the share prices. Equities react immediately to news, and investors 
do not have the time to buy or sell shares after the news is published.  
 
• The strong form of efficiency is the most rigorous and involves the assumption 
that in addition to historical market data and publicly known information, all 
private information is reflected in share prices too. The markets are completely 
efficient, and as a result it is impossible to beat the market, even with insider 
information.  
 
This paper tests the EMH in its weakest form. If the weak form of market efficiency holds, 
the monthly published short interest data of NASDAQ listed stocks would not have any 
impact on the subsequent development of share prices. The price of a stock is always 




2.5 Single and Multi-Factor Asset Pricing Models 
This section describes three asset pricing models that aim to explain the return of a stock 
or a portfolio. The difference between the actual return and the expected return according 
to these models is called excess return, abnormal return or alpha. 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) 
and Mossin (1966) is a widely used market equilibrium model that establishes a linear 
relationship between the price of a security or portfolio and its risk. The required variables 
to calculate the expected return of a stock or portfolio according to the CAPM are the 
current risk-free rate, which usually refers to the Treasury bill rate or the government 
bond yield; the expected return of the market; and the beta of the security or portfolio 
being analysed. The difference between the risk-free rate and the expected return of the 
market is called the risk premium and compensates for being exposed to systematic, non-
diversifiable risk. The beta serves as a coefficient to measure the volatility of a security 
or a portfolio relative to the overall market. Stocks that move in the same direction as the 
market have a positive beta, whereas stocks that move in the opposite direction of the 
market have a negative beta. Assets with a high beta are riskier and must therefore offer 
a higher return on average to compensate for the risk. Consequently, investors can only 
achieve a higher expected return at higher market risk.  
 Jensen (1968) developed the risk-adjusted performance measure Jensen’s Alpha 
which results directly from the CAPM. The abnormal return represents the difference 
between the actual return realised and the expected return according to the CAPM.  
 
The CAPM corresponds to a one-factor model when realised returns are analysed over 
several periods, such as months or years. In the decades following Jensen’s work, 
economists thoroughly revised the CAPM and developed multi-factor models to improve 
the explanatory variability in the cross section of stock returns, since beta was not the 
only risk measure considered. 
 
Using linear cross-sectional regressions, Fama and French (1992) examined a number of 
different potential factors, such as the price-earnings ratio or the debt-equity ratio, in 
terms of their effect on average returns. They concluded that the estimated beta factor of 
the CAPM had only a weak influence on the U.S. stock market for the years 1963 to 1990. 
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However, the factors market capitalisation and book-to-market ratio (B/M)1 improve the 
explanatory power considerably. Consequently, shares with a low market capitalisation 
achieve higher returns than those with a high market capitalisation, while shares with a 
high B/M achieve a better performance than those with a low B/M.  
 
Using this foundation, Fama and French (1993) developed the three-factor (FF3F) model 
by extending the CAPM with the additional factors Small Minus Big (SMB) 
and High Minus Low (HML), which capture returns related to company size and the B/M 
as follows: 
 
• SMB measures the historic excess returns of small-capitalised companies over 
large-capitalised companies. The return equals a long position in small sized 
firms, financed with a short position in the large sized firms. 
 
• HML measures the historic excess returns of stocks with a high B/M over stocks 
with a low B/M. The return equals a long position in stocks with a high B/M, 
financed with a short position in stocks with a low B/M. 
 
While the CAPM can only explain approximately 70% of U.S. stock returns, the  
FF3F model can determine approximately 90% (Fama & French, 1993, pp. 20–25). 
 
Based on the work of Fama and French (1993) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),  
Carhart (1997) proposed the four-factor (C4F) model by adding a further component to 
the FF3F model – momentum. 
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examined the effect of momentum (MOM) by 
applying an investment strategy for NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) and AMEX 
(American Stock Exchange) listed stocks between 1965 and 1989. They documented 
significant quarterly and annual positive returns when buying securities that had 
performed relatively well in the past and selling securities that had performed relatively 
poorly in the past. Their conclusion was that rising prices tend to rise further, while falling 
prices tend to fall further. 
 
 
1 The B/M of a company is calculated by dividing the equity capital by the market capitalisation.  
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PR1YR is the prior-one-year return momentum factor as defined by Carhart (1997), and 
it can be obtained as follows. First, the monthly return of all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks over the previous eleven months is calculated. Second, the returns are 
sorted and divided into three equal-weighted portfolios according to their ranking. The 
top 30%, the medium 40% and the bottom 30% of portfolios are formed on a monthly 
basis. Finally, PR1YR is determined by the difference between the average return of the 
top and bottom portfolios.  
 The investigation of U.S. equity mutual funds in the period 1963 to 1993 has 
shown that the returns are strongly correlated with the PR1YR, SMB and HML 
coefficients (Carhart, 1997, p. 63). For this reason, general consensus suggests that the 
C4F model has a stronger explanatory power of returns compared to FF3F model, and the 
potential of risk-adjusted abnormal returns under the restrictions of the C4F model is 
expected to decrease even further. 
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3 Literature Review 
This chapter discusses previous research on how short interest affects future stock price 
movements and the extent to which investors are able to achieve excess returns. Due to 
the transparent publication of short interest data in the U.S., as described in section 2.2, 
most academic studies have focused on U.S. markets. If not described otherwise, the 
authors of all studies in this chapter have defined the level of short interest as the total 
number of shares divided by total shares outstanding. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Models  
Miller (1977), as well as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), argued against the efficient 
market hypothesis in their examination of the influence of short selling constraints on the 
speed of price adjustments to bad news. Their results indicate that the high costs of short 
selling make it more difficult to reflect bad information on a stock price rapidly. 
Furthermore, equities are expected to be overvalued by market participants, when short 
selling constraints prevent investors to sell short (as explained in section 2.1). Short 
sellers trade only if they expect that the price will significantly decrease as a reward for 
the high transaction costs and risks. Therefore, the only counterparties that benefit from 
short selling are the well-informed traders who are strongly convinced of future negative 
price development. The uninformed or less-informed investors are unwilling to sell short.  
 Despite the supposed success of short sellers identifying overpriced stocks, Jones 
and Lamont (2002, p. 211) emphasised that using short interest as a proxy for shorting 
demand is problematic, because the amount of short interest solely represents the 
matching amount of supply and demand. In addition, stocks that cannot be shortened due 
to limited supply have an infinite cost of shortening, and yet the level of short interest is 
zero. 
 
3.2 The Relation Between Short Interest and Stock Returns in the U.S. 
The first researchers to empirically investigate short sales and equity returns came to 
different conclusions. Seneca (1967) employed a multiple regression analysis on the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500), and found that high short interest leads to 
lower returns. In contrast, Mayor (1968) additionally included samples of 14 randomly 
selected firms from the most frequently shorted stocks in the U.S. and could not find a 
significant relationship between short interest levels and stock prices. Based on a large 
number of regressions, he suggested that the findings were consistent with the random 
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walk hypothesis, as short sellers are unable to predict future price movements and 
outperform the market.  
 Figlewski (1981) tried a different approach. For the period 1973 to 1979, all  
S&P 500 stocks were sorted annually into ten portfolios according to their average  
six-month short interest level. Each security in the portfolio was weighted in relation to 
its relative market value in order to calculate monthly returns. The study verified a 
negative relationship between a high short interest and future excess returns using the 
CAPM. Although all ten portfolios showed positive returns, Figlewski advised investors 
to purchase securities with a low short interest in order to improve portfolio returns. 
 
The authors of more recent studies have proposed similar results using different 
methodological analyses, including regression analysis, the calendar time portfolio 
approach and time-series studies.  
 Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001) analysed monthly short interest 
data from all NYSE and AMEX listed firms from 1976 to 1993 and compared it with the 
fundamentals of each security, such as cash-flow-to-price, earnings-to-price and book-to-
market. The authors showed that short sellers predominantly use these ratios to identify 
overpriced stocks, which have relatively low short sale transaction costs. As a result, 
companies with low fundamental metrics have increased short interest. When the ratios 
had improved, it was found that short sellers covered their positions to generate a profit. 
Moreover, the empirical results showed a negative correlation between short interest and 
stock return.  
 
Several academic studies have examined short interest data in connection with the cross 
section of stock returns after controlling for the associated risk exposures according to 
the FF3F or the C4F model. Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002) 
reported negative abnormal returns for highly shorted NASDAQ stocks between 
June 1988 and December 1994 using the calendar time portfolio approach after 
controlling for the C4F sensitivities (market beta, size, B/M, and momentum). In a similar 
manner to Figlewski (1981), the authors formed portfolios based on the short interest 
level of a stock. In particular, they constructed portfolios of highly shorted stocks that had 
at least 2.5%, 5%, 7% and 10% short interest as of shares outstanding. Instead of value-
weighting each stock, they chose to equal-weight the securities in their portfolios. The 
portfolios were rebalanced monthly to replace all securities that did not meet the threshold 
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with firms that did. Their findings were consistent with Dechow et al. (2001), as highly 
shorted companies generated significant negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, heavily 
shorted stocks experienced liquidation or forced delisting within 36 months far more often 
than companies with high values of the fundamentals.  
 Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005) documented similar results based on short 
interest data for AMEX stocks from 1980 to 2002, as well as for NASDAQ stocks from 
June 1988 to December 2002. Using the same research design as Desai et al. (2002), they 
calculated the abnormal returns using the FF3F and C4F regression model on five 
different high short interest portfolios. Furthermore, after forming equally weighted 
portfolios of highly shorted stocks, they divided each portfolio into thirds by institutional 
ownership. This additional segmentation enabled them to not only prove that highly 
shorted stocks underperform the market significantly, but also that the relationship 
becomes even stronger when the institutional ownership is low. However, after 
constructing portfolios using a value-weighted approach, the authors did not find a 
statistically significant underperformance or a relationship between institutional 
ownership and subsequent returns. 
 The consideration of both weighting methods in the construction of portfolios was 
also applied in a study conducted by Boehmer, Huszar and Jordan (2010), who analysed 
the monthly abnormal returns of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed stocks during the 
period 1988 to 2005. As suggested by Asquith et al. (2005), the calendar time portfolio 
approach was adopted, and the portfolios were both value-weighted and equal-weighted. 
The highly shorted portfolios included securities from the 99th, 95th and 90th percentiles 
of the short interest level distribution as of the previous month, whereas the lightly shorted 
portfolios included securities from the 1st, 5th and 10th percentiles. The study supported 
the argument that securities with low short interest experience both statistically and 
economically significant positive abnormal returns, whereas heavily shorted stocks 
underperform the market. These positive returns among stocks with an extreme lack of 
short interest are often larger (in absolute value) than negative returns for highly shorted 
stocks. Securities with greater short interest are therefore priced more accurately, and 
short selling promotes market efficiency.  
 One of the most recent studies related to short interest was conducted by Guo and 
Wu (2019), who investigated the predictive power of short interest for future returns of 
stocks under consideration of the credit rating of a company. The authors also propose 
the monthly change in short interest as an additional return predictor for future stock 
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performance, as it improves the sentiment of short sellers. Although they covered all 
listed securities on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX from January 1986 to 
February 2017, they dropped observations with stock prices below $5 per share and 
companies with a market value below the 5th percentile of the NYSE market 
capitalisation. Thus, the results are not determined by small and illiquid stocks. For each 
month, the authors sorted the securities into decile portfolios according to either the 
current short interest level or the monthly change in short interest level, resulting in 20 
portfolios for each month. For the analysis, the average credit rating was assigned to the 
portfolio. After running multiple regression to estimate the excess return, they obtained a 
slightly different result to Boehmer et al. (2010). 
 First, the findings of Guo and Wu (2019) showed that the return predictability, 
when considering the short interest level and credit rating of a stock, is mainly significant 
for firms with a speculative credit rating but insignificant for investment-grade 
companies. Second, the abnormal return is larger in the highly shorted portfolios 
(regardless of the sorting criteria, short interest level or monthly change in short interest 
level), whereas Boehmer et al. (2010) observed larger abnormal returns in the lightly 
shorted portfolios. One possible explanation is that Guo and Wu (2019) excluded stocks 
with share prices below $5, which means that the results of Boehmer et al. (2010) could 
have been mainly influenced by stocks priced below $5. 
 
3.3 The Relation Between Short Interest and Stock Returns in Other Countries 
One of the first studies outside the U.S. was conducted by Aitken, Frino, McCorry and 
Swan (1998), who researched the intraday reactions to short sales on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX). The event study included a thorough analysis of all short sales that 
were placed either in the form of market orders or limit orders between 1994 and 1996. 
Abnormal returns were calculated based on four different performance indicators for 
either a period of 15 minutes after the short sale transactions occurred or on a  
transaction-by-transaction basis for 30 trades before and after the short sale. The authors 
found significant negative abnormal returns after a short sale has been executed. 
 Chien, Wang and Hsu (2016) analysed short sales by institutions and individuals 
on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) between 2006 and 2012. Their findings generally 
supported the results of previous studies, documenting a negative relationship between 
the level of short interest and future stock returns. For their regression analysis, the 
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authors considered four fundamental-to-price ratios at the end of each fiscal year, as well 
as institutional holdings of each stock. 
 Mohamad (2017) examined daily short interest data from the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) over the period 2003 to 2010 and compared the abnormal returns of the 
constructed portfolios considering many different criteria and research methods. The 
author formed the portfolios according to the top and bottom percentile rank using a  
120- and 60-day estimation period, used different models of event studies, compared 
equal and value-based weightings and applied different models of the calendar time 
portfolio approach. He found significant negative abnormal returns associated with 
heavily shorted stocks throughout all methodologies. The author emphasised that the 
chosen weighting method for the calendar time portfolio approach has a large impact on 
the final result and can lead to conflicting results. It is therefore important to disclose both 
results. 
 
3.4 Research on Short Interest Indicators and Sectoral Breakdown  
As mentioned at the beginning of chapter 3, nearly all the investigations have measured 
shorting activity based on the metric short interest as a percentage of shares outstanding. 
By contrast, Hong, Li, Ni, Scheinkman and Yan (2015) have shown that using SIR as a 
proxy for overvalued stocks results in even higher monthly abnormal returns and higher 
statistical significance. They analysed all shares listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ over the years 1988 to 2008. The researchers argued that SIR is inversely 
correlated to trading volume and therefore reflects the marginal shorting costs per share. 
If the SIR of a share is already at a high level, additional short sellers would only bet on 
falling prices and accept the high costs of short selling if they firmly believe that the share 
is overvalued. Apart from these findings, little research has been conducted comparing 
different short interest indicators. 
 
There is also a lack of literature focusing on whether individual stock sectors are more 
affected by short sales than others, particularly on the NASDAQ stock exchange. 
Nevertheless, Linnertová (2015) analysed the short selling activity of NASDAQ listed 
stocks from 2000 to 2014 and found that the sectors technology (4.6), utilities (6.3), 
construction & materials (7.5) and oil & gas (7.5) had the lowest average level of SIR. In 
contrast, the sectors travel (28.4), food & beverage (24.5), health care (23.1) and 
chemicals (22.1) reported the highest SIR during this period. 
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4 Data and Methodology 
This chapter provides information on the stocks examined, the time frame and the 
methodology applied to answer the research questions. The corresponding Microsoft 
Excel workbooks used for data processing are provided in appendices A to D. 
 
4.1 Dataset and Selection Criteria 
Previous authors examining the influence of short interest on the U.S. stock market have 
incorporated delisted securities using the bias-free database of the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) or COMPUSTAT. Access to these two databases is restricted, 
which is why the relevant information has been retrieved from the Bloomberg Terminal. 
Multiple aspects are taken into account to ensure that the applied backtesting 
methodology is bias-free of delistings, mergers and acquisitions, stock splits or dividend 
payments.  
 
The dataset includes the SIPF and SIR as described in section 2.3, as well as the total 
return price for all stocks included in the NASDAQ Composite Index2. The examined 
period is from January 2012 to December 2019.  
 First, the historical index constituents3 of the NASDAQ as of every year-end from 
31 December 2011 to 31 December 2018 were exported to multiple spreadsheets in 
Microsoft Excel. In addition to the ticker and name, the Bloomberg Industry 
Classification Systems (BICS) of each security were also retrieved. This resulted in eight 
different index groups, each containing between 2,442 and 2,633 securities. The 
procedure ensured that firms which were delisted in the course of the year were also taken 
into account. IPOs listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market between 2012 and 2018 were 
automatically included in the following year, whereas IPOs of 2019 were not covered.  
 Second, with the assistance of the Bloomberg Excel Add-In, the following 
monthly financial data for each security in the corresponding year were retrieved4: 
 
• Short Interest as % of Float (SIPF) 
• Short Interest Ratio (SIR) 
• Total Return Gross Index (TR)  
 
2 Bloomberg ticker: CCMP:IND 
3 Bloomberg function: <MEMB> 
4 Bloomberg functions: <SI_PERCENT_EQUITY_FLOAT>; <SHORT_INT_RATIO>;  
 and <TOT_RETURN_INDEX_GROSS_DVDS> 
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TR specifies the adjusted historical price of a security reflecting capital gains, cash 
dividends, spin-offs, stock splits and other corporate actions. The collected data was 
cross-checked to ensure correctness by examining additional Bloomberg functions.5 
 
The Excel spreadsheets allow a clear overview of the large amount of data and enable 
further processing of the data. Missing data from the Bloomberg Terminal are indicated 
with the error value #N/A N/A.   
 All cells with a SIPF or SIR of zero have been replaced by the error term  
#N/A N/A, as it cannot be verified whether the figure was correct and representative or 
simply an error. Boehmer et al. (2010), in contrast, included non-reported short positions 
in their examination. However, the replacement in this dataset is negligible, since only 
0.2% of all SIPF and SIR values are zero. Missing TR values result in the inability to 
calculate the monthly returns. As a result, for securities that do not have a TR in a given 
month but contain SIPF and SIR figures, the SIPF and SIR cells of the corresponding 
month have been manually replaced with the error value #N/A N/A. 
 
 
4.2 Data Description  
The original dataset covers 4,404 unique ticker symbols, of which 4,370 provide a short 
interest metric for at least one month. After the adjustments as described in section 4.1, 
the final dataset consists of 230,791 monthly observations for the SIPF and 241,761 
monthly observations for the SIR. Brief summaries of the SIPF and SIR data are shown 
in tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
 The median for both metrics is highest in 2012 but remains more or less constant 
for the following years, which is in line with figure 1 in section 1.1. The mean is higher 
than the median for both ratios, and indicates that the distribution is skewed to the right. 
In five out of eight years, the maximum values of the SIPF are above 100%, which is very 
unusual but can occur in certain situations. One possible explanation is that offshore short 
seller or foreign broker-dealers are involved in the transactions. A second reason could 
be that transactions involved one party borrowing the shorted security and passing it on 
to a third party as a new transaction (Ashraf, 2020). Furthermore, the maximum value of 
the variable SIR is disproportionally high in every year. A review of the individual 
incidents shows that extraordinarily high SIR values are primarily found in securities with 
 
5 Bloomberg functions: <SHORT_INT>; <EQY_FLOAT>; and <PX_LAST> 
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low trading volumes, particularly in stocks of small-capitalised firms or companies that 
have issued multiple share classes. Occurrences with a high SIR or SIPF of over 100% 
are subject to short sale constraints, as explained in section 2.1, and result in higher costs 
of borrowing the specific stock. 
 
Year Ticker Observations Mean Median Min Max 
2012 2,421 28,863 5.19 3.1249 0.000100 110.8056 
2013 2,313 27,602 4.87 2.3065 0.000045   68.7051 
2014 2,337 27,917 5.53 2.7751 0.000100 122.7883 
2015 2,445 29,210 5.56 2.7886 0.000100   84.6201 
2016 2,482 29,668 5.59 2.9754 0.000001   72.0377 
2017 2,420 28,890 5.75 2.8491 0.000100 227.2843 
2018 2,420 28,876 5.80 2.9237 0.000020 131.1491 
2019 2,489 29,765 5.78 2.9071 0.000095 100.6904 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of SIPF Entries in the Dataset 
 
Year Ticker Observations Mean Median Min Max 
2012 2,521 30,171 8.82 5.4170 0.0010   1,121 
2013 2,412 28,912 6.88 4.1360 0.0010   501.7 
2014 2,438 29,238 6.88 4.2720 0.0010   2,717 
2015 2,542 30,455 7.30 4.4300 0.0010   2,686 
2016 2,590 31,020 8.32 4.8005 0.0010   2,788 
2017 2,524 30,215 7.49 4.2210 0.0010 10,351 
2018 2,536 30,347 7.24 4.0020 0.0010   3,079 
2019 2,622 31,403 7.28 4.2170 0.0010   1,322 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of SIR Entries in the Dataset 
4.3 Portfolio Formation and Rebalancing Method  
The chosen method to assemble the portfolios and measure their abnormal returns was 
the calendar time portfolio approach, as applied by other researchers in their 
investigations (Asquith et al., 2005; Boehmer et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2002). In each 
calendar month over the period 31 December 2011 until 30 November 2019, portfolios 
were formed based on the 1st, 10th, 90th and 99th percentile of either the SIPF or the SIR 
level. As a first step, the percentile rank for each security based on the SIPF and SIR at 
the end of the month was identified using Microsoft Excel.6 Cells with the error value 
#N/A N/A were excluded from the calculation. This ranking process was repeated for 
every month to obtain different percentile rankings for each security in a specific month 
 
6 Microsoft Excel function: QUANTILSRANG.INKL() 
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over a period of eight years. The described process ensured that different portfolio 
formations could be constructed every month. 
 
Four SIPF and four SIR portfolios were then formed according to the percentile threshold. 
Stocks that were below the 1st or 10th percentile in the respective month, as well as stocks 
that were above the 90th or 99th percentile, met the criteria for inclusion in the specified 
portfolio: 
 
• SIPF 1%  = includes securities below the 1st percentile 
• SIPF 10% = includes securities below the 10th percentile 
• SIPF 90% = includes securities above the 90th percentile 
• SIPF 99% = includes securities above the 99th percentile 
 
• SIR 1% = includes securities below the 1st percentile 
• SIR 10% = includes securities below the 10th percentile 
• SIR 90%  = includes securities above the 90th percentile 
• SIR 99%   = includes securities above the 99th percentile 
 
As illustrated in table 4, the annual number of securities within the monthly formed 
portfolios fluctuates. This variation is explained by missing values, yearly index 
adjustments, but also as a consequence of multiple securities sharing the same percentile 
rank in a given month.  
 
Year SIPF 1% SIPF 10% SIPF 90% SIPF 99% SIR 1% SIR 10% SIR 90% SIR 99% 
2012 300 2,890 2,890 297 316 3,024 3,022 312 
2013 283 2,765 2,765 279 304 2,897 2,894 299 
2014 290 2,798 2,797 288 303 2,930 2,927 300 
2015 300 2,927 2,926 300 312 3,050 3,047 312 
2016 302 2,972 2,972 300 312 3,108 3,106 312 
2017 301 2,893 2,892 300 312 3,025 3,024 312 
2018 301 2,892 2,892 300 316 3,041 3,040 312 
2019 304 2,979 2,979 300 330 3,147 3,144 324 
Total 2,381 23,116 23,113 2,364 2,505 24,222 24,204 2,483 




The selected shares are weighted equally within the portfolio. It is unclear whether the 
equally weighted method is inferior to the value-weighted method when analysing the 
performance of shorted stocks in a portfolio (Boehmer et al., 2010, p. 84). The two 
weighting methods could lead to conflicting results, which is why it is generally 
recommended to present the outcome for both methods (Mohamad, 2017, p. 1489).  
However, for reasons of feasibility, this paper only presents the results for equally 
weighted portfolios.  
 
The TR price in the dataset allows the monthly returns of each security to be calculated 






𝑟	 = One-month return of the security  
𝑃! = Price of the security at month t 
𝑃!"# = Price of the security at month t-1 
 
After determining the one-month return for all securities, the corresponding portfolio 
returns was computed based on the following equation: 
 





𝑅$	 = Portfolio return  
𝑤% = Weight of security i  
𝑟% = Return of the security i 




4.4 Method of Analysis  
A total of 96 monthly portfolio returns for eight different strategies were derived. For an 
initial comparison of the absolute return, the total return after eight years for every 
strategy was determined as follows:  
 





𝑅)*!+, = Return of the portfolio for the full period 
𝑅$! = Portfolio return at month t 
T = Number of monthly portfolio returns 
 
For a second performance comparison, the geometric mean return (GMR) of every 
portfolio was calculated. The GMR is considered an adequate method of increasing the 
comparability of annual returns over multiple periods, as the compounding of returns is 
factored into the equation: 
 
𝐺𝑀𝑅	 = 	 01	 +	𝑅)*!+,
! 	− 	1 
where: 
𝐺𝑀𝑅 = Geometric mean return 
𝑅)*!+, = Return of the portfolio for the full period 
T = Number of years 
 
To determine whether abnormal portfolio returns were generated, a multiple linear 
regression analysis for all eight portfolio formations7 based on the FF3F and C4F model 
was performed in Microsoft Excel with the Analysis ToolPak Add-in. Thus, a total of 16 




7 The results of a long-short strategy by combining two portfolio formations are not presented in this thesis, 
because the findings are of little relevance to answering the research questions. However, the results can 
be accessed upon request. 
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The FF3F regression equation as defined by Fama and French (1993) was applied as 
follows: 
 
𝑅$! 	− 	𝑅𝑓! 	= 	𝛼$ 	+ 	𝛽#	[𝑅𝑀! − 𝑅𝑓!] +	𝛽-	𝑆𝑀𝐵! 	+ 	𝛽.	𝐻𝑀𝐿! 	+ 	𝑒$! 
 
where: 
𝑅$! = Return of the portfolio at month t 
𝑅𝑓! = Return of the risk-free asset at month t 
𝛼$        = Intercept (average monthly abnormal return) 
𝛽#,-,.    = Factor coefficients 
𝑅𝑀!     = Return of the market at month t 
𝑆𝑀𝐵!  = Historic excess return of SMB portfolio at month t 
𝐻𝑀𝐿!   = Historic excess return of HML portfolio at month t 
𝑒$!       = Error term 
 
The C4F regression equation (Carhart, 1997) was formed by the inclusion of the 
momentum factor: 
 
𝑅$! 	− 	𝑅𝑓! 	= 	𝛼$ 	+ 	𝛽#	[𝑅𝑀! − 𝑅𝑓!] +	𝛽-	𝑆𝑀𝐵! 	+ 	𝛽.	𝐻𝑀𝐿! 		+ 	𝛽0	𝑀𝑂𝑀! 	+ 	𝑒$! 
 
where: 
𝑅$! = Return of the portfolio at month t 
𝑅𝑓! = Return of the risk-free asset at month t 
𝛼$        = Intercept (average monthly abnormal return) 
𝛽#,-,.,0  = Factor coefficients 
𝑅𝑀!     = Return of the market at month t 
𝑆𝑀𝐵!  = Historic excess return of SMB portfolio at month t 
𝐻𝑀𝐿!   = Historic excess return of HML portfolio at month t 
𝑀𝑂𝑀! = Historic excess return of MOM portfolio at month t 




The relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables was 
measured by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, which estimates the intercept 
and 𝛽-coefficients. In both equations, the dependent variable is given as the portfolio 
return minus the risk-free asset return (𝑅$! 	− 	𝑅𝑓!) . The monthly return of the  
market (𝑅𝑀!)  corresponds to the NASDAQ Composite Total Return Index and was 
retrieved from Refinitiv Eikon. The monthly risk-free asset return (𝑅𝑓!) refers to the yield 
on the one-month Treasury bills and was obtained, along with the SMB, HML and MOM 
factors, from Kenneth French’s website. 8  Although these factor loadings are not 
exclusively derived for NASDAQ listed shares, but for all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
listed securities, the factors are generally considered to be representative for the entire 
U.S. stock market and were therefore applied in this paper.  
 
The F-test was performed for all 16 portfolio regressions, to assess the overall 
significance of the regression coefficients. A null hypothesis H0 was established, which 
suggests that all beta coefficients are zero and thus the FF3F and C4F model have no 
explanatory power, whereas the alternative hypothesis H1 suggests that at least one beta 
coefficient is considered a significant predictive parameter. The hypotheses for the FF3F 
and C4F regressions are as follows: 
 
FF3F       C4F 
H0 : 𝛽# = 𝛽- = 𝛽.	= 0     H0 : 𝛽# = 𝛽- = 𝛽. = 𝛽0 = 0  
H1 : at least one 𝛽 ≠ 0    H1 : at least one 𝛽 ≠ 0 
   
The null hypothesis was tested according to the following F-statistic formula (Newbold, 
Carlson, & Thorne, 2013, p. 505): 
𝐹	 = 	
𝑆𝑆𝑅	/	𝐾
𝑆𝑆𝐸	/	(𝑛 − 𝐾 − 1) 
where: 
SSR = Amount variability explained by the regression 
SSE  = Amount variability unexplained by the regression  
K = Degrees of freedom for the numerator 




If the derived F-value was higher than the critical F-value at a significance level of 0.05, 
the null hypothesis was rejected.  
 Once the statistically significant explanatory power of at least one of the regression 
coefficients was found, a further null hypothesis was examined with the student’s t-test. 
The t-statistic measures the significance of the estimated individual regression 
parameters. The intercept 𝛼$ is of particular interest when verifying whether the SIPF 
and SIR portfolios generate abnormal returns, both positive and negative. The null 
hypothesis supports the EMH and states that the average monthly abnormal return, 
denoted as 𝛼$,	is equal to zero under consideration of the FF3F and C4F model. Hence, 
the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1 are noted as follows: 
 
H0 : 	𝛼$ = 0    H1 : 𝛼$	 ≠	0  
 













?̅? = Sample mean 
𝜇  = Proposed constant for the population mean 
𝑠1̅ = Estimated standard error of the mean 
s = Sample standard deviation 
 
As the FF3F and C4F model imply an abnormal return of zero, nothing is subtracted from 
the mean of monthly abnormal in the numerator, thus the t-value of the intercept is solely 
determined as the monthly abnormal return divided by the estimated standard error. 
The obtained t-value of the intercept and of each regression coefficient was reviewed for 
statistical significance based on the p-value at a significance level of 0.05. As a result,  
H0 is rejected in favour of H1 if the p-value of the intercept is less than 0.05.  
 In a last step, a brief sector analysis was conducted by comparing the sector 
exposure of the equally weighted market index and the eight portfolio formations.   
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5 Empirical Results 
This chapter contains the empirical results for all statistical analyses described in 
chapter 4. First, descriptive statistics on the resulting portfolio returns are presented. 
Second, the returns are measured on an absolute level, and on a risk-adjusted level based 
on the FF3F and C4F model. Finally, the industry sector exposure within the portfolios is 
analysed. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The monthly returns (n=96) for the SIPF and SIR portfolios, as well as for the benchmark, 
measured by the NASDAQ Composite Total Return Index (XCMP), are summarised in 
tables 5 and 6.   
 For both metrics, the lightly shorted portfolios show a right skewed distribution 
and a higher mean than the heavily shorted portfolios, which have a left skewed 
distribution. Each created portfolio exhibits a smaller median and a higher maximum 
return than the market index XCMP. While the SIPF 10% portfolio is the only one that 
has a lower standard deviation (0.0292) than the XCMP (0.0388), it is also the portfolio 
with the highest median, lowest monthly loss and the lowest maximum return among all 
eight formations constructed by the level of SIPF or SIR. Under consideration of all 
displayed returns, the SIR 1% portfolio has the highest mean (0.0191), the highest 
maximum value (0.8398) and the largest standard deviation (0.1101), and it is also the 
only one with a negative median (-0.0057). Among all observations, the largest losses 
within a month are achieved by the four heavily shorted portfolios – that is, the  
SIPF 99% (-0.2061), the SIPF 90% (-0.1744), the SIR 90% (-0.1519) and the SIR 99% 
portfolio (-0.1349). Furthermore, the four heavily shorted portfolios in the 90th and  
99th percentiles present a lower mean and a lower median but also a higher maximum loss 
and a higher maximum gain compared to the market index. 
 
 SIPF 1% SIPF 10% SIPF 90% SIPF 99% XCMP 
Mean 0.0161 0.0157 0.0029 -0.0014 0.0147 
Median 0.0086 0.0123 0.0111 0.0002 0.0195 
Standard Deviation 0.0448 0.0292 0.0610 0.0765 0.0388 
Minimum -0.0818 -0.0657 -0.1744 -0.2061 -0.0940 
Maximum 0.2932 0.1154 0.1719 0.1522 0.0979 
Sum 1.5480 1.5036 0.2753 -0.1345 1.4124 
Count 96 96 96 96 96 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Returns on SIPF Portfolios 
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  SIR 1% SIR 10% SIR 90% SIR 99% XCMP 
Mean 0.0191 0.0130 0.0038 -0.0018 0.0147 
Median -0.0057 0.0102 0.0067 0.0008 0.0195 
Standard Deviation 0.1101 0.0450 0.0479 0.0509 0.0388 
Minimum -0.1169 -0.0940 -0.1519 -0.1349 -0.0940 
Maximum 0.8398 0.2434 0.1243 0.1377 0.0979 
Sum 1.8306 1.2485 0.3660 -0.1740 1.4124 
Count 96 96 96 96 96 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Returns on SIR Portfolios 
 
5.2  Absolute Performance  
The total return of the four SIPF portfolios compared to the market index XCMP for the 
entire period under examination is shown in figure 2. The two portfolios containing 
lightly shorted stocks outperform the benchmark, whereas the two formations including 
heavily shorted stocks experience a much worse development than the XCMP. After eight 
years, the SIPF 90% portfolio shows an overall performance of only +9.92%, while the 
SIPF 99% portfolio even has a negative return of -34.32%. Although the SIPF 1% 
portfolio has the highest total return after eight years (+327.66%), the portfolio did not 
generate profits between early 2014 and late 2018, and then increased strongly again in 
2019. In contrast, the SIPF 10% portfolio has a slightly lower total return (+326.09), but 
it outperformed the benchmark XCMP (+278.66) consistently and has not seen any major 
setbacks, with the exception of late 2018. 
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A similar pattern can be observed in the performance comparison of the SIR portfolios, 
as illustrated in figure 3. The portfolios containing heavily shorted stocks have far poorer 
returns than their corresponding counterparts. While the SIR 90% portfolio generated a 
total return of +29.07%, the SIR 99% portfolio lost -25.85% over the whole period.  
The total return of the benchmark XCMP (+278.66%) was only surpassed by the  
SIR 1% portfolio (+298.03%). However, the outperformance was not consistent, and the 
portfolio did not generate a positive return between mid-2015 and early 2019. The total 
performance of the SIR 1% portfolio is skewed by the one-month return of one included 
stock undergoing a major corporate action event. More specifically, the shares of the 
cloud computing company Phunware Inc. rose by more than 2,106% in January 2019 due 
to a reverse merger (Bylund, 2019). The SIR 10% portfolio had a better return than the 
XCMP until February 2018, but it underperformed the benchmark over the remaining  
23 months, resulting in a lower return (+215.82%).  
 
 
Figure 3: Total Return of SIR Portfolios 2012–2019  
 
As an additional comparison, table 7 displays the GMR and the annual returns of all eight 
portfolios and the XCMP. The results offer a similar view to the total performance 
displayed in figures 2 and 3. The highest GMR is attained by the SIPF 10%  
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experienced only one year with negative returns. A negative GMR is only obtained by 
the SIPF 99% (-5.12%) and the SIR 99% formation (-3.67%). All of the heavily shorted 
portfolios have a considerably smaller GMR than the benchmark and report negative 
annual returns in four out of eight years. However, none of the 90th and 99th percentile 
portfolios generated a negative return in the years 2013 and 2017. The SIR 1% portfolio 
has a higher GMR than the XCMP but also yielded a total of four negative annual returns. 
 
  SIPF 1% SIPF 10% SIPF 90% SIPF 99% SIR 1% SIR 10% SIR 90% SIR 99% XCMP 
GMR 19.86% 19.92% 1.19% -5.12% 18.85% 15.46% 3.24% -3.67% 18.11% 
2012 38.26% 26.06% 0.53% -11.65% 44.74% 31.48% 5.15% 24.88% 17.45% 
2013 66.37% 52.61% 42.80% 13.76% 71.85% 59.40% 46.38% 41.02% 40.11% 
2014 5.56% 12.90% -13.47% -11.88% -11.72% 3.43% -0.57% 2.11% 14.75% 
2015 -0.72% 9.26% -13.75% -23.87% -7.76% 8.75% -10.47% -34.55% 6.98% 
2016 4.24% 20.14% -7.96% 14.20% -1.94% 9.73% -1.21% -12.25% 8.87% 
2017 0.63% 22.66% 13.45% 10.13% 5.40% 15.26% 11.88% 1.91% 29.64% 
2018 11.38% -3.48% -21.91% -38.41% -16.02% -15.62% -18.45% -20.01% -2.84% 
2019 51.31% 26.69% 25.81% 25.74% 126.43% 25.53% 4.52% -11.92% 36.68% 
Table 7: GMR and Annual Returns of SIPF and SIR Portfolios 
  
5.3 Fama-French Three-Factor Model Regression Analysis 
To evaluate the monthly abnormal return or the so-called risk-adjusted return of the 
composed short interest portfolios, the regression results of the FF3F model were 
analysed. In theory, abnormal returns can be explained by the application of asset pricing 
models and will therefore disappear. Thus, if the FF3F regression is conducted using 
monthly returns of the XCMP minus the monthly risk-free rate as the dependent variable, 
the intercept will be close to zero.  
 Table 8 displays the regression results of the FF3F model for each portfolio and 
includes the calculated F-value and the estimated regression coefficients. The 
corresponding p-values at the 0.05 significance level are listed underneath in brackets. 
Moreover, the second column contains the adjusted R2, which indicates to what extent the 
independent variables in the FF3F model are capable of explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable. The adjusted R2 value is always between 0 (unusable model) and 1 
(perfect model fit). Further details of the regression results are given in Appendix E. 
 For each regression, the F-value is greater than the critical value of the  
F-distribution 9 , which results in a p-value below 0.05. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Hence, the correlation between at least one beta coefficient and the dependent 
 
9 F0.05 (3, 92) = 2.704 
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variable is statistically significant, although the low adjusted R² value in the SIPF 1% 
portfolio (0.073) and in the SIR 1% portfolio (0.094) indicates that the monthly abnormal 
returns are not strongly explained by the three factors. The second null hypothesis, stating 
that the intercept is equal to zero, is rejected for six out of eight portfolios. However, the 
null hypothesis is not rejected for the SIR 1% and SIR 10% portfolio, as the p-value is 
not statistically significant.  
 The results for the monthly abnormal returns are consistent with several prior 
studies (Asquith et al., 2005; Boehmer et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2002; Mohamad, 2017). 
Regardless of the significance, the intercept for both short interest metrics is highest for 
the 1% portfolios containing the least shorted stocks. The excess return gradually declines 
as the short interest threshold of the portfolios increases. The lowest significant monthly 
abnormal return was attained by the SIPF 99% portfolio (-0.018), while the highest 
significant alpha was generated by the SIPF 1% portfolio (0.010). With a market risk 
premium (RM-Rf) above 1.0, the SIPF 90% and SIPF 99% portfolios reacted more 
strongly to market movements, while the remaining six formations with a beta below 1.0 
experienced less sensitivity to the NASDAQ Composite Index. With both metrics, the 
SMB coefficient is nearly always positive, which is explained by the numerous small-
capitalised firms listed at the NASDAQ Stock Market. However, the estimated HML 
coefficient is predominantly positive and only in three regressions statistically significant, 
which contradicts the results of previous studies (Asquith et al., 2005; Boehmer et al., 
2010; Desai et al., 2002).  
 
Portfolio Adjusted R2  F-value Intercept RM-Rf SMB HML 
SIPF 1% 0.073 3.497 0.010 0.374 -0.037 -0.005 
    (0.019) (0.033) (0.003) (0.858) (0.980) 
SIPF 10% 0.460 27.996 0.009 0.448 0.300 0.160 
    (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.004) (0.102) 
SIPF 90% 0.834 160.437 -0.011 1.077 1.222 0.194 
    (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.086) 
SIPF 99% 0.594 47.250 -0.018 1.248 1.057 0.550 
    (<.001) (0.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.014) 
SIR 1% 0.094 4.273 0.008 0.747 0.749 -0.248 
    (0.007) (0.468) (0.013) (0.139) (0.601) 
SIR 10% 0.409 22.947 0.005 0.609 0.555 0.162 
    (<.001) (0.221) (<.001) (0.001) (0.301) 
SIR 90% 0.827 152.028 -0.006 0.799 1.026 0.425 
    (<.001) (0.005) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
SIR 99% 0.495 32.028 -0.011 0.703 0.771 0.377 
    (<.001) (0.007) (<.001) (<.001) (0.023) 
Table 8: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF and SIR Portfolios 
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5.4 Carhart Four-Factor Model Regression Analysis 
The regression results of the C4F model are summarised in table 9 (see Appendix F for 
additional details). As a logical implication, the conducted F-test for each C4F regression 
also revealed a higher F-value than the critical F-value10, so that the first null hypothesis 
can be rejected. By adding the independent variable MOM, the adjusted R2 marginally 
increased. Thus, the explanatory power of the regression equation was improved. 
 The intercepts estimated by the C4F regression differ only moderately from the 
FF3F regression. With a statistically significant intercept unequal to zero, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected for the same six portfolio formations as mentioned in  
section 5.3, while the intercepts of the SIR 1% and SIR 10% portfolio remain 
insignificant. The momentum factor is negative for each portfolio formation, which is 
consistent with the findings of Boehmer et al. (2010). With the exception of the SIPF 1% 
and SIR 99% portfolio, all MOM coefficients are significant. Compared to the FF3F 
model, the momentum factor has led to less negative abnormal return for the portfolios 
including highly shorted securities. The largest difference is observed with the SIPF 99% 
portfolio, where the negative monthly abnormal return was -1.8% under the FF3F model 
and declined to -1.4% per month under the C4F model. In contrast, the addition of the 
momentum factor has also resulted in a marginal higher significant alpha for the  
SIPF 1% (0.011) and SIPF 10% portfolio (0.010), both containing lightly shorted stocks.  
 
Portfolio Adjusted R2  F-value Intercept RM-Rf SMB HML MOM 
SIPF 1% 0.083 3.163 0.011 0.302 -0.050 -0.199 -0.239 
    (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.809) (0.402) (0.157) 
SIPF 10% 0.479 22.793 0.010 0.397 0.291 0.022 -0.170 
    (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.005) (0.849) (0.042) 
SIPF 90% 0.859 145.141 -0.009 0.966 1.203 -0.104 -0.366 
    (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<0.001) (0.415) (<.001) 
SIPF 99% 0.668 48.699 -0.014 1.007 1.014 -0.099 -0.797 
    (<.001) (0.007) (<.001) (<.001) (0.686) (<.001) 
SIR 1% 0.144 4.992 0.014 0.444 0.695 -1.065 -1.004 
    (0.001) (0.235) (0.156) (0.158) (0.061) (0.013) 
SIR 10% 0.449 20.316 0.007 0.500 0.536 -0.129 -0.358 
    (<.001) (0.084) (<.001) (0.001) (0.487) (0.007) 
SIR 90% 0.834 119.915 -0.005 0.748 1.017 0.289 -0.167 
    (<.001) (0.015) (<.001) (<.001) (0.009) (0.031) 
SIR 99% 0.493 24.095 -0.010 0.669 0.765 0.284 -0.115 
    (<.001) (0.013) (<.001) (<.001) (0.159) (0.420) 
Table 9: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF and SIR Portfolios 
 
10 F0.05 (4, 91) = 2.472 
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5.5 Sector Analysis 
In a final step, the sector weightings between the equal-weighted NASDAQ Composite 
Index (CCMP) and the constructed short interest portfolios were compared. As illustrated 
in figure 4, the number of health care companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market 
has been steadily increasing since 2012, while the number of firms in the sectors 
financials, technology, consumer discretionary, communications and energy has been 
declining. The sector weightings industrials, consumer staples, materials and utilities 
remained relatively constant between 2012 and 2019. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sector Breakdown Equal-weighted CCMP 2012–2019  
 
Figures 5 and 6 depict the relative difference between the average sector weightings of 
the constructed portfolios and the market index.11 As shown in figure 5, the four portfolios 
containing slightly shorted stocks tend to overweight companies from the financial and 
industrial sectors, and underweight the sectors technology, health care and consumer 
discretionary. The exposure of the remaining sectors is broadly the same. 
 Figure 6 indicates that the stocks above the 90th and 99th percentile have a higher 
exposure to health care, consumer discretionary and communications than the 
equal-weighted CCMP. Furthermore, the relative sector weighting in financials, 
technology and industrials appears to be lower for the portfolios including highly shorted 
 
11 The annual breakdown for each formation is presented in appendix G. The results are not discussed, 
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securities. It is notable that the SIPF and SIR formations in each percentile threshold tend 
to contain less technology stocks than the market index in relative terms.   
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This paper examines the relation between the monthly published short interest data and 
subsequent one-month returns of NASDAQ listed stocks from 2012 to 2019. The results 
suggest that during this period, equal-weighted portfolios containing lightly shorted 
securities generated a higher absolute and risk-adjusted performance than the market 
index, whereas equal-weighted portfolios with heavily shorted securities underperformed 
considerably. These findings are consistent with prior research arguing that a high level 
of short interest leads to subsequent price declines and lower stock returns, while a low 
level of short interest leads to future price increases and higher stock returns. The fact 
that abnormal returns can be generated with short interest data supports the argument that 
stock markets are inefficient and contradicts the efficient market hypothesis in its weakest 
form, which states that prices already reflect all historical market trading information.  
  
The regression analysis to measure abnormal returns was conducted on both the  
Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model. Although the latter 
included momentum as an additional risk exposure, the explanatory power of abnormal 
returns only improved marginally. The portfolio formation was performed by considering 
the two indicators SIPF and SIR. However, the absolute performance over eight years, 
along with the regression results, revealed that formations considering SIPF produce 
more significant outcomes and higher abnormal returns than SIR, regardless of the asset 
pricing model. One plausible explanation could be that the SIR does not provide an 
adequate indication for the short selling activity of small-capitalised companies with low 
trading volumes. 
 
Using the superior metric SIPF and applying the Carhart four-factor model, the lightly 
shorted portfolio generated a significant excess return when containing stocks below the  
1st percentile (1.1% per month) and below the 10th percentile (1.0% per month). In 
contrast, the heavily shorted portfolios generated a significant negative abnormal return 
if they comprised stocks above the 90th percentile (-0.9% per month) and above the  
99th percentile (-1.4% per month).  
 
 35 
In conclusion, SIPF can be a valuable sentiment indicator for forecasting future share 
price development, since short sellers seem capable of identifying overvalued stocks 
while avoiding undervalued or fairly valued stocks. Although past performance is no 
guarantee of future results, buying stocks with a low short interest level could potentially 
lead to higher returns for investors, while stocks with a high short interest level should be 
avoided or sold. 
 
The relative sector weighting analysis has shown that health care and consumer 
discretionary stocks may be more exposed to high levels of short interest, while financials 
and technology stocks tend to be less shorted. However, results of this investigation are 
not sufficient to draw firm conclusions. 
 
6.2 Limitations of this Thesis 
This study has several limitations. First, the dataset may have been biased by removing 
securities without short interest; by missing data from Bloomberg, as a result of some 
companies having very low stock liquidity and turnover; or by not detecting and 
eliminating outliers. Second, the replication of portfolios with such a large number of 
positions, and rebalancing them on a monthly basis, is associated with substantial 
transaction costs and is not feasible in practice. Lastly, due to time constraints, the 
abnormal returns were solely analysed for equal-weighted portfolios, even though prior 
literature recommends constructing value-weighted portfolios in addition, to avoid 
conflicting results (Boehmer et al., 2010; Mohamad, 2017).  
 
The findings and interpretation in this paper also require consideration of statistical 
limitations in the applied research methodology. The sample size of 96 monthly returns 
for the regression analysis is small, and statistical hypothesis testing generally requires 
larger number of observations to increase the precision of the estimated coefficients. 
Furthermore, the applied OLS estimation method for the linear regression equation is 
based on several assumptions, including the supposition that the residuals are normally 
distributed and have a constant variance (homoscedasticity). However, insufficient 
investigation was made into verifying the validity of the OLS assumptions. The t-statistics 
may therefore have led to erroneous outcomes and incorrect alpha coefficients. If the OLS 
requirements had not been met, a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable 
could have been a potential workaround, but this procedure also complicates the 
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interpretation of the regression parameter (i.e., the intercept as the monthly abnormal 
return). 
 
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
Future studies could investigate the relationship between short interest and the subsequent 
stock return for non-U.S. markets. Since only a few stock exchanges publish short interest 
data by traded volume and position, it would be desirable to implement short interest 
estimations offered by the financial data providers IHS Markit or S3 Partners. In addition, 
the short interest level and subsequent price movements could be monitored over shorter 
time periods, for example on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis. Further studies could 
also focus entirely on large-capitalised stocks in order to exclude small companies with 
low market liquidity. Lastly, an empirical study concentrating on the sectoral breakdown 
of highly shorted stocks over an extended time frame and divided up into sub-periods 
could give more insight into historical shorting activity in different economic cycles, as 
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Appendices A – D 
Supplementary Data Files 
 
The separately submitted Microsoft Excel workbooks are divided into four parts: 
 
Appendix A Exported Data from the Bloomberg Terminal and Data Preparation 
  A1_NASDAQ_Composite_Index_All Members.xlsx 
  A2_Bloomberg_Export_Values.xlsb 
  A3_Data_Description.xlsb 
 
Appendix B Stock Ranking and Portfolio Formation  
  B1_Monthly_Percentile_Ranking_and_Returns.xlsb 
  B2_Portfolio_Formation_1st_and_10th_Percentile.xlsb 
  B3_Portfolio_Formation_90th_and_99th_Percentile.xlsb 
 
Appendix C Portfolio Return Analysis and Regression Analysis 
  C1_Price_History_Nasdaq_Composite_Total_Return_Index.xlsx 
  C2_F-F_Research_Data_Factors.xlsx 
  C3_F-F_Momentum_Factor.xlsx 
  C4_Portfolio_Returns_and_Regression_Analysis.xlsb 
  C5_Portfolio_Returns_Charts.xlsx 
 
Appendix D Sector Analysis 





Results of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model Regression Analysis 
 
SIPF 1%       
R-Squared 0.10235726      
Adj. R-Squared 0.073086301      
Standard Error 0.043138255      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.01952217 0.00650739 3.496887834 0.01867089  
Residual 92 0.171203629 0.001860909    
Total 95 0.190725799        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.010249379 0.004743027 2.160936214 0.033297554 0.000829318 0.019669439 
Rm-RF 0.374067022 0.121232837 3.085525611 0.002684016 0.133288144 0.6148459 
SMB -0.037059439 0.206496458 -0.179467676 0.857965172 -0.447179229 0.37306035 
HML -0.004959308 0.194567074 -0.025488936 0.97972018 -0.391386311 0.381467696 
Table 10: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 1% Portfolio 
 
SIPF 10%        
R Square 0.477234793      
Adj. R-Squared 0.460188101      
Standard Error 0.021515651      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.038879639 0.01295988 27.99574284 5.94016E-13  
Residual 92 0.042588937 0.000462923    
Total 95 0.081468577        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.009343077 0.002365634 3.949502562 0.00015325 0.004644724 0.014041429 
Rm-RF 0.44818025 0.060466132 7.412087345 5.90197E-11 0.328089293 0.568271207 
SMB 0.300282713 0.102992245 2.915585656 0.004458868 0.095731224 0.504834201 
HML 0.160228583 0.097042342 1.651120331 0.102123685 -0.032505884 0.35296305 
Table 11: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 10% Portfolio 
 
SIPF 90%        
R Square 0.839528667      
Adj. R-Squared 0.834295907      
Standard Error 0.024826877      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.296667587 0.098889196 160.4370412 1.98852E-36  
Residual 92 0.056706394 0.000616374    
Total 95 0.353373981        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.011319363 0.002729701 -4.146740751 7.50106E-05 -0.016740786 -0.005897941 
Rm-RF 1.076809619 0.069771779 15.43331174 2.87935E-27 0.938236843 1.215382395 
SMB 1.222453203 0.118842598 10.28632177 5.72504E-17 0.986421545 1.458484861 
HML 0.194264738 0.111977013 1.73486265 0.086114022 -0.028131276 0.416660752 
Table 12: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 90% Portfolio 
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SIPF 99%        
R Square 0.606417789      
Adj. R-Squared 0.593583586      
Standard Error 0.048779163      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.337281866 0.112427289 47.2501339 1.42343E-18  
Residual 92 0.218905423 0.002379407    
Total 95 0.55618729        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.017686213 0.005363242 -3.297672233 0.001386782 -0.028338074 -0.007034352 
Rm-RF 1.248375923 0.137085665 9.106538736 1.73201E-14 0.976111958 1.520639887 
SMB 1.056537496 0.233498655 4.524811905 1.80255E-05 0.592789011 1.52028598 
HML 0.549924959 0.220009344 2.499552741 0.014207483 0.112967411 0.986882506 
Table 13: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 99% Portfolio 
 
SIR 1%        
R-Squared 0.122297503      
Adj. R-Squared 0.093676769      
Standard Error 0.104754503      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.140670646 0.046890215 4.273038712 0.007162456  
Residual 92 1.009562542 0.010973506    
Total 95 1.150233188        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.008395091 0.011517699 0.728886147 0.467922759 -0.014480053 0.031270235 
Rm-RF 0.747449859 0.294394979 2.538935489 0.012798102 0.16275602 1.332143698 
SMB 0.748669535 0.501444345 1.493026181 0.13885194 -0.247242217 1.744581286 
HML -0.248166185 0.472475703 -0.52524645 0.600675464 -1.186543713 0.690211343 
Table 14: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIR 1% Portfolio 
 
SIR 10%        
R Square 0.428008979      
Adj. R-Squared 0.409357098      
Standard Error 0.034640403      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.082607098 0.027535699 22.94722852 3.54021E-11  
Residual 92 0.110396091 0.001199958    
Total 95 0.193003189        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.004690524 0.003808693 1.231531201 0.221262973 -0.002873869 0.012254917 
Rm-RF 0.608525841 0.097351048 6.250840147 1.25902E-08 0.415178256 0.801873426 
SMB 0.55489774 0.165818496 3.346416429 0.001186709 0.225567893 0.884227586 
HML 0.162469093 0.156239095 1.039874769 0.301123254 -0.147835236 0.472773421 
Table 15: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIR 10% Portfolio 
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SIR 90%        
R Square 0.832142351      
Adj. R-Squared 0.826668732      
Standard Error 0.019989423      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.182240465 0.060746822 152.0278179 1.56917E-35  
Residual 92 0.036761085 0.000399577    
Total 95 0.219001551        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.006309277 0.002197826 -2.870690069 0.005082171 -0.010674348 -0.001944205 
Rm-RF 0.798949524 0.056176923 14.22202361 5.89382E-25 0.687377306 0.910521742 
SMB 1.025947041 0.095686416 10.7219717 7.01958E-18 0.83590556 1.215988522 
HML 0.424505963 0.090158573 4.708437035 8.7958E-06 0.245443255 0.603568671 
Table 16: FF3F Regression Analysis Results of SIR 90% Portfolio 
 
SIR 99%        
R Square 0.510856423      
Adj. R-Squared 0.494906089      
Standard Error 0.036218974      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 3 0.126044129 0.04201471 32.02794513 2.88356E-14  
Residual 92 0.120686897 0.001311814    
Total 95 0.246731026        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.010921562 0.003982256 -2.742556557 0.00732697 -0.018830666 -0.003012458 
Rm-RF 0.70322628 0.101787358 6.908778171 6.2281E-10 0.5010678 0.90538476 
SMB 0.771434173 0.173374884 4.449515155 2.40808E-05 0.427096689 1.115771658 
HML 0.377422202 0.163358947 2.310385865 0.02310252 0.052977233 0.701867171 




Results of the Carhart Four-Factor Model Regression Analysis 
 
SIPF 1%        
R-Squared 0.122048357      
Adj. R-Squared 0.083457076      
Standard Error 0.04289625      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.02327777 0.005819443 3.16258889 0.017553574  
Residual 91 0.167448029 0.001840088    
Total 95 0.190725799        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.01148742 0.004795371 2.395522466 0.018644897 0.001962004 0.021012836 
Rm-RF 0.301748111 0.130749585 2.307832259 0.023275497 0.042030122 0.561466099 
SMB -0.04978001 0.205530976 -0.242201984 0.809168667 -0.458042046 0.358482026 
HML -0.199300765 0.236511815 -0.842667268 0.401623923 -0.66910243 0.2705009 
MOM -0.238868345 0.167200762 -1.428631918 0.156533546 -0.570992118 0.093255428 
Table 18: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 1% Portfolio 
 
SIPF 10%        
R-Squared 0.500473691      
Adj. R-Squared 0.478516491      
Standard Error 0.021147233      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.040772879 0.01019322 22.79314679 4.57576E-13  
Residual 91 0.040695697 0.000447205    
Total 95 0.081468577        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.010222095 0.002364049 4.323977887 3.91411E-05 0.005526203 0.014917988 
Rm-RF 0.396833253 0.064457662 6.1564947 1.97673E-08 0.268796027 0.52487048 
SMB 0.291251007 0.10132381 2.874457703 0.00503828 0.089983705 0.492518309 
HML 0.022244619 0.116596917 0.190782224 0.849121206 -0.209360833 0.253850072 
MOM -0.169598405 0.082427567 -2.057544722 0.042494987 -0.33333064 -0.005866169 
Table 19: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 10% Portfolio 
 
SIPF 90%        
R-Squared 0.86449518      
Adj. R-Squared 0.858538924      
Standard Error 0.022938972      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.305490103 0.076372526 145.1407065 1.28712E-38  
Residual 91 0.047883878 0.000526196    
Total 95 0.353373981        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.00942182 0.002564347 -3.67415896 0.000402802 -0.014515582 -0.004328059 
Rm-RF 0.965966578 0.069918959 13.81551707 4.60201E-24 0.827081154 1.104852002 
SMB 1.202956411 0.109908662 10.94505552 2.76229E-18 0.984636355 1.421276467 
HML -0.103601998 0.126475812 -0.819144757 0.414843964 -0.354830662 0.147626665 
MOM -0.366113002 0.089411399 -4.094701657 9.14398E-05 -0.543717762 -0.188508243 
Table 20: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 90% Portfolio 
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SIPF 99%        
R-Squared 0.681589525      
Adj. R-Squared 0.66759346      
Standard Error 0.044114718      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.379091431 0.094772858 48.69865444 7.78469E-22  
Residual 91 0.177095859 0.001946108    
Total 95 0.55618729        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.013555422 0.004931584 -2.748695409 0.007215493 -0.023351407 -0.003759436 
Rm-RF 1.007079974 0.134463528 7.489614361 4.30583E-11 0.739984693 1.274175255 
SMB 1.014094625 0.211369086 4.797743346 6.2497E-06 0.594235902 1.433953348 
HML -0.098505793 0.243229935 -0.40499042 0.68643502 -0.58165218 0.384640593 
MOM -0.796997115 0.171950101 -4.635048829 1.18734E-05 -1.138554867 -0.455439362 
Table 21: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIPF 99% Portfolio 
 
SIR 1%        
R-Squared 0.17994163      
Adj. R-Squared 0.143895108      
Standard Error 0.101810984      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.206974835 0.051743709 4.991927687 0.001104401  
Residual 91 0.943258353 0.010365476    
Total 95 1.150233188        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.013597038 0.011381449 1.194666678 0.235321775 -0.009010812 0.036204888 
Rm-RF 0.443583452 0.31032419 1.429419511 0.156307762 -0.172837429 1.060004332 
SMB 0.695220802 0.48781213 1.425181455 0.157525674 -0.27375807 1.664199673 
HML -1.064741532 0.561342792 -1.896775993 0.061029335 -2.17978003 0.050296966 
MOM -1.003666456 0.396838283 -2.529157339 0.01315498 -1.791936956 -0.215395957 
Table 22: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIR 1% Portfolio 
 
SIR 10%        
R-Squared 0.471743495      
Adj. R-Squared 0.448523429      
Standard Error 0.033472178      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.091047999 0.022762 20.31619942 5.50724E-12  
Residual 91 0.10195519 0.001120387    
Total 95 0.193003189        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept 0.006546575 0.003741854 1.749553537 0.083566614 -0.00088616 0.013979309 
Rm-RF 0.500106537 0.102024616 4.901822281 4.12018E-06 0.29744717 0.702765904 
SMB 0.535827272 0.160376945 3.341049259 0.001211887 0.217258173 0.854396371 
HML -0.128884373 0.184551462 -0.698365492 0.486729496 -0.495473181 0.237704435 
MOM -0.358107432 0.130467669 -2.744798273 0.007294978 -0.617265428 -0.098949435 





SIR 90%        
R-Squared 0.840535181      
Adj. R-Squared 0.833525738      
Standard Error 0.019590041      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.184078508 0.046019627 119.9146963 2.06552E-35  
Residual 91 0.034923043 0.00038377    
Total 95 0.219001551        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.005443166 0.00218997 -2.485497613 0.014763549 -0.009793274 -0.001093059 
Rm-RF 0.748356573 0.059711274 12.5329192 1.58756E-21 0.629747462 0.866965683 
SMB 1.017047968 0.093862756 10.83547947 4.65695E-18 0.830601134 1.203494803 
HML 0.288548333 0.108011217 2.67146637 0.008947413 0.07399732 0.503099346 
MOM -0.167107804 0.076357952 -2.188479404 0.031195101 -0.318783495 -0.015432114 
Table 24: C4F Regression Analysis Results of SIR 90% Portfolio 
 
SIR 99%        
R-Squared 0.514358915      
Adj. R-Squared 0.493012054      
Standard Error 0.036286819      
Observations 96      
       
  df SS MS F p-value  
Regression 4 0.126908303 0.031727076 24.09529518 1.30257E-13  
Residual 91 0.119822723 0.001316733    
Total 95 0.246731026        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Intercept -0.010327686 0.004056503 -2.545957844 0.012579211 -0.018385431 -0.002269941 
Rm-RF 0.668535615 0.11060376 6.044420296 3.25069E-08 0.448834832 0.888236398 
SMB 0.765332241 0.173862876 4.40193019 2.9155E-05 0.419974997 1.110689486 
HML 0.284198531 0.200070203 1.420494036 0.158881221 -0.11321635 0.681613412 
MOM -0.114582778 0.14143856 -0.810124046 0.419982355 -0.395533102 0.166367545 
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